# Records of Processing Activities (ROPA) **Controller:** Diana Beauty School Plymouth, 92 Cornwall Street, Plymouth PL1 1NF **Contact:** info@strykora.co.uk **Version:** 1.0 (front-end build — no server-side processing yet) **Legal basis:** UK GDPR Article 30 > **Scope note.** At v1.0 this system performs no server-side processing of personal data. Rows marked **(v1.1)** describe processing that will begin when the backend is connected, and are recorded here so the record is complete at that point. Rows marked **(v1.0)** describe what is true today. --- ## 1. Processing activities | # | Activity | Data subjects | Data categories | Purpose | Lawful basis | Recipients | Retention | Transfers | Security | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | **Enquiry preparation (v1.0)** | Site visitors | name, phone, service interest, preferred date/time, consent flag | Nothing is transmitted. The visitor is shown a payload they may copy or read aloud | None engaged — no processing by the controller occurs | None | Nothing is stored by the controller | None | N/A (browser-local) | | 2 | **Enquiry handling (v1.1)** | Prospective clients and students | name, phone, service interest, preferred date/time, marketing flag, timestamp | Reply to the enquiry; confirm a slot | Art 6(1)(a) consent | Hosting provider (processor) | 24 months from last contact, then deleted | None (UK-only hosting) | TLS in transit; encryption at rest; access limited to staff role; audit logged | | 3 | **Course enrolment (v1.1)** | Enrolled students (18+) | name, email, phone, course, purchase reference, start/end dates | Deliver the course, issue a certificate | Art 6(1)(b) contract | Hosting provider; payment provider (separate controller) | Course end + 24 months | None | As row 2; payment data never reaches our servers (hosted fields) | | 4 | **Learning progress (v1.1)** | Enrolled students | user id, lesson id, completion flag, timestamps | Teach the course; unlock practical sessions at the published pass mark | Art 6(1)(b) contract | Hosting provider | Course end + 24 months | None | Role-scoped queries; a student cannot read another student's progress | | 5 | **Quiz attempts (v1.1)** | Enrolled students | answers, score, pass/fail, attempt timestamp | Mark the work; gate practical sessions | Art 6(1)(b) contract | Hosting provider | Course end + 24 months | None | Marking server-side; tampering with the request cannot force a pass | | 6 | **Treatment consultation (v1.1)** | Clients receiving a treatment requiring it | health information relevant to that treatment (e.g. pregnancy, allergies, patch-test result) | Treat the person safely | Art 9(2)(a) explicit consent **and** Art 9(2)(h) health care | Treating staff only | 7 years (clinical record convention) | None | Recorded on the treatment record, not in this website's database; field-level encryption; read access audited | | 7 | **Marketing consent (v1.1)** | Anyone who opts in | email/phone, consent timestamp, source | Send course dates and offers — only where opted in | Art 6(1)(a) consent + PECR reg. 22 | Hosting provider; email provider (processor) | Until withdrawn, then 24 months as proof of consent | None | Opt-in unticked by default; one-click withdrawal | | 8 | **Audit logging (v1.1)** | Staff; anyone whose record is accessed | actor id, role, tenant, action, resource, UTC time, IP/UA/request id, outcome | Security, accountability, breach investigation | Art 6(1)(c) legal obligation; 6(1)(f) legitimate interests | Hosting provider | 12 months rolling | None | Append-only store; application role has no UPDATE/DELETE; hash-chained | | 9 | **Staff portal drafts (v1.0)** | Staff | homepage wording, course structure, lesson text | Prepare content before publishing | Not personal data about data subjects — it is the school's own content | None — stored in the staff member's browser | Until the staff member resets or clears it | None | Browser `localStorage` on the staff device only | | 10 | **Certificate verification (v1.1)** | Certificate holders | name, course, completion date, verification code | Let an employer confirm a certificate is genuine | Art 6(1)(b) contract | Public verification page | 7 years | None | Verification page shows name + course + date only — no contact details, no address | --- ## 2. Categories of recipients | Recipient | Category | Safeguard | |---|---|---| | Hosting provider | Processor | UK-region hosting; DPA; encrypted volume; access via key-based SSH only | | Payment provider | Separate controller for card data | Hosted payment fields only; no PAN, CVV or expiry on our infrastructure | | Email provider (if used for marketing) | Processor | UK/EEA; DPA; unsubscribe honoured on withdrawal | | Salon booking system (Versum / Booksy) | Separate controller for appointments | The salon transfers bookings itself; no automated feed in v1.0 | | Accountants / insurers | Separate controller | Only on lawful request; recorded in the audit log | **No** advertising networks, analytics providers, data brokers or social-media pixels are recipients of any data from this system. Verified by test: zero third-party network requests on all three pages. --- ## 3. International transfers None at v1.0. The system is designed for a single UK VPS and makes no third-party calls. Before any transfer outside the UK is introduced, an adequacy assessment or IDTA must be completed and this record updated. This is a **blocking** requirement, not a routine change. --- | Item | Value | |---|---| | **Data Protection Officer** | Not yet appointed — required before launch | | **Privacy contact** | info@strykora.co.uk | | **Supervisory authority** | Information Commissioner's Office, ico.org.uk, 0303 123 1113 | | **Breach notification** | 72 hours to the ICO where the threshold is met; affected individuals without undue delay where high risk | | **Review cadence** | Annually, and on any change listed in `childrens-code.md` §8 | --- ## 4. Technical and organisational measures | Measure | Implementation | |---|---| | Encryption in transit | TLS 1.2+ (to be enforced at the reverse proxy) | | Encryption at rest | LUKS on the VPS volume; field-level encryption for Article 9 data in v1.1 | | Access control | Deny-by-default allow-list; role checked at the endpoint **and** the query layer | | Audit | Append-only store, hash-chained, off-host | | Minimisation | Five enquiry fields; no DOB; no address; no analytics | | Deletion | Hard delete or irreversible anonymisation across database, cache, object storage and search index | | Backup | Documented purge window; deleted data must not survive it; restore tested | | Secrets | Never in code, logs or the repository | | Device-local data | Portal drafts stay in the staff member's browser and are labelled as such in the UI | --- *Prepared for Diana Beauty School Plymouth. Engineering record, not legal advice.*